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The purpose of this analysis is to use market data and historical debt underwriting trends from reliable 
sources and observe how those underwriting trends affect the equity returns and the pricing of 
commercial real estate.   
 
The Modigliani-Miller Proposition I Theorem states that in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and 
asymmetric information, in an efficient market the value of an investment is unaffected by how that 
investment is financed.  In this scenario, all assets would trade at prices irrespective of their capital 
structure or amount of leverage.  To illustrate this point, if one were investing in an asset on an all cash 
basis, and another investor were purchasing the same asset using leverage (defined as the use of debt), 
then the two would pay the same price assuming that when the first investor purchased the asset all-cash it 
could lever its position at the entity level at the same cost of capital that the second investor used to lever 
the asset.  The theorem assumes that the cost of borrowing is the same when the collateral is real estate 
and when the collateral is an entity.   
 
In reality, it is much easier for borrowers to acquire aggressive financing for real estate assets than for 
entities.  Lenders view real estate as a tangible, stable, cash flowing asset with a low risk profile.  The 
discrepancy in the cost of capital for the two options results in a discrepancy in pricing.  Low cost debt 
has a tremendous impact on real estate pricing.   
 
In the pricing of commercial real estate most investors determine value by using a discounted cash flow 
(“DCR”) analysis in which a future stream of cash flows is projected and then discounted back at a 
specified discount rate to arrive at a net present value (NPV).  In the formula below, n is equal to the 
number of periods, C is equal to the cash flows, t is equal to the period, and r is equal to the discount rate.  
Thus, the net present value is the cumulative present value of a several cash flows discounted by their 




The discount rate that one uses is determined by the investor’s cost of capital and the investor’s return 
requirements.  Investors seeking higher yields will discount future cash flows more heavily and arrive at a 
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provides an indication of an asset’s price.  The cap rate is equal to an annual net operating income of an 
asset divided by the price, i.e. the higher the cap rate for an asset, the lower the price.   
 
Cap rate =   
 
The cap rate is a pre-financing metric as it does not account for future cash flows or financing costs.  Both 
cap rates and discount rates are used in real estate valuation because when projecting cash flows, 
investors usually make an exit or sale assumption at the end of the hold period and a cap rate is used on 
the last year’s income to arrive at an exit price.   
 
Most investors first seek a target return, which varies based on their investment criteria, i.e. stable core 
investors seek lower returns than risk-taking opportunity funds.  This target return is the discount rate that 
investors use in the valuation of the assets they seek to acquire.  The investor’s return is achieved by 
balancing their cost of capital with the valuation of the asset they seek to acquire.  The lower the cost of 
capital the more an investor can afford to pay for an asset while achieving a specific return.  As long as 
there is a liquid debt market, as there was in the early to mid-2000s, investors are able to pay higher prices 
for real estate and still achieve target returns.  When the liquidity spigot is turned off, however; and 
inexpensive debt is difficult to attain, most investment funds do not lower their targeted returns.  One of 
the most active buyer types in the early to mid-2000s were investment funds.  These funds operate by 
providing a specified target rate of return and an investment strategy.  The investment period, or “life” of 
these funds varies, but most funds have a five 
to ten year horizon in which they must invest 
and later redeem the capital that they invested 
on behalf of their investors and return the 
specified rate of return.  Because most 
investors do not change their return 
requirements due to rapid changes in 
liquidity, when the cost of capital increases 
the only way for investors to maintain their 
target return is to pay less for the assets they acquire.   
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This paper seeks to observe the rise and fall of inexpensive debt by observing the debt underwriting 
trends and volume of commercial real estate debt that was issued from 2003 to 2008.  The author does not 
have access to sophisticated statistical software such as SAS, nor does the author have access to original 
loan documents or underwriting data for a pool of actual loans.  Instead, this study observes the 
underwriting trends as they have been collected by the Trepp CMBS Deal Library.  Because the 
Commercial Mortgage Backed Security (CMBS) legal structure requires detailed disclosures, the CMBS 
database provides a reliable and measurable stock of information that is not publically available though 
other commercial real estate lenders such as commercial banks, investment funds or life insurance 
companies.  The Trepp CMBS Deal Library is the largest commercially available database of CMBS and 
contains comprehensive information and history on the deals, loans and properties within the global 
securitized commercial market.7  The advantage of using a CMBS database is that it contains loan 
information for a large number of CMBS deals and syndicators as well as originators.  Consequently, 
there is a broader representation of loans than typically found in commercial loan research using a single 
pool of data from a bank or a life insurance company.  Of total commercial mortgages outstanding at year 
end 2008, the CMBS market constituted roughly 25%.  For the aforementioned reasons, however; the 
CMBS underwriting data is available and assumed to be reliable and thus the results of the analysis below 
can be extrapolated to apply to the universe of commercial mortgages.   
 
Investors speak of cap rates as a barometer for valuation in the real estate industry and there is much talk 
about the upward or downward movement in cap rates, but cap rates alone do not determine pricing.  Cap 
rates are a byproduct of the cost of capital and the required returns of investors.  Because investors are 
still seeking returns in a pre “credit crunch” world and inexpensive debt has been greatly reduced, it is 
projected that cap rates will increase dramatically in the next few years greatly reducing the price of 
commercial real estate in the United States.  This decrease in price has tremendous implications for all 
involved in the real estate community including owners, brokers, special servicers, banks and the United 
States Federal Government.   
 
Asset Pricing, Leverage and the Bull Market of 2003 - 2007 
 4
 
Bull Market of 2003 to 2007 
Commercial real estate has a unique 
status among investments on the 
risk/return spectrum.  Unlike a 
security, real estate is a tangible asset 
that requires constant management.  
The cash flows generated from real 
estate are a combination of several 
factors including macro and micro 
market trends, management, and 
tenant quality.  Beyond Buy/Sell 
options a manager has many ways to 
alter the Risk/Return characteristics 
of a single asset through leasing, renovation or budgeting. 8   
 
A handful of events in the early 2000’s created a shift in thinking among lenders as it relates to 
commercial real estate.  After the recession of the early 2000’s, the accounting scandals of Enron and 
Worldcom and the bursting of the “dot com bubble” a large amount of both equity and debt was allocated 
to real estate, which was viewed as a safe and stable cash flowing asset class.   
 
This tremendous inflow of capital into the commercial real estate market brought about a bull market that 
began in 2003 and peaked in 2007 and was characterized by record pricing, transaction volume and 
number of properties sold.  Total commercial real estate transactions increased 224.4%, from $11.8 
billion in 2003 to $26.7 billion in 2007.5  During this same period the transaction volume by number of 
properties increased 147% from 419 to 616.  Interestingly, the transaction volume by transaction price 
increased at a faster rate than the transaction volume by number of properties because the price of 
commercial real estate was increasing at a rapid pace as well.  The average sale price increased 177%, 
from $24.4 million to $43.3 million.   
 
The transaction and pricing boom that occurred during this period has been attributed to several factors 
including a “paradigm shift” in the way real estate is priced in terms of fund allocation and its role in 































Year Count Of Sale Price Aggregate Sale Price Ave Sale Price
2002 396 $9,886,981,761 $24,967,126
2003 419 $11,879,967,526 $28,353,144
2004 610 $20,077,767,012 $32,914,372
2005 774 $26,528,178,480 $34,274,132
2006 668 $24,142,315,255 $36,141,191
2007 616 $26,655,820,852 $43,272,436
2008 253 $10,465,008,208 $41,363,669
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assumptions about real estate fundamentals and net operating income growth.  An observation of 
NCREIF; however, suggests that in 2003 the room for fundamentals growth was limited.   
 
NOI Growth 
In the first quarter of 2001 the 4 
quarter moving average NOI growth 
rate was at 12.56%.  The theory of 
mean reversion states that high and 
low periods of growth are temporary, 
and growth will tend to have an 
average rate over time.  After a 
period of unsustainable double digit 
growth, NOI growth would have to 
shrink.  By the first quarter of 2003, 
the 4 quarter moving average NOI growth rate had fallen from 12.56% in the first quarter of 2001 to -
2.85%.  Despite the declining NOI growth, transaction volume increased during this period by 53%.  
Investors entering the market during periods of negative NOI growth, from the first quarter of 2002 to the 
fourth quarter of 2003, would have had reason to expect NOI growth assuming NOI growth rates would 
mean revert to a 25-year average of 2.30%.  Transaction volume increased by 203% between 2002 and 
2004.  By the first quarter of 2005, the 4 quarter moving average NOI growth rate was just above the 25-
year average at 2.88%.  Assuming that the NOI numbers had reverted to the mean, NOI growth would not 
be a primary motivation for investment.  Any investment that in an environment of higher than average 
NOI growth would have to experience NOI loss.  Transaction volume; however, grew an additional 33% 
between 2004 and 2007.  NOI growth trends were not a major motivation for investing in commercial real 
estate during the early to mid-2000’s. 
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In the first quarter of 2003, average vacancy rates 
were 10.84%, about 2.18% higher than the 25-
year average of 8.66%.  The vacancy rate had 
grown 5.22% from a low of 5.62% in the third 
quarter of 2000.   
 
In 2003 both NOI growth and vacancy were off 
of the 25-year averages suggesting that a patient 
investor could enter the market and achieve growth by simply waiting for real estate fundamentals to 
mean revert. However, this alone was not enough motivation to spark the dramatic increase in transaction 
volume and the cap rate compression that occurred in the next five years.   
 
The real motivation for the bull market of 2003 to 2008 was the availability of inexpensive debt.  The 
inexpensive cost of debt allowed investors to pay record pricing while maintaining target leveraged 
returns.  From a lender’s perspective the bull market was characterized by a sharp increase in the amount 
of debt available as well as increasingly aggressive underwriting and leverage.   
 
Securitization 
The influx of capital to the real estate industry 
included both direct investment in real estate 
assets and securitization.  Commercial Mortgage 
Backed Securities (CMBS) emerged in the mid 
1980’s amid a strong economy, deregulation of 
the financial services industry, and preferential 
tax treatments to commercial real estate.1  With 
the real estate recession of the early 1990’s the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), which was 
created by Congress to facilitate the bailout of the ailing thrift industry, was mandated by Congress to 
liquidate the assets it had acquired.1  The RTC utilized the CMBS market as a conduit, issuing nearly $15 
billion between 1991 and 1993.  The subordination levels and perceived built-in diversification of 
securities appealed to many investors.  With the success of the RTC’s foray into the CMBS market, 



















































20-Year Average - 8.72%
Asset Pricing, Leverage and the Bull Market of 2003 - 2007 
 7
insurance companies, pension funds and commercial banks used CMBS to liquidate balance sheet assets 
and reduce risk. 
 
In a CMBS structure several commercial real estate loans are pooled into one collateral base and then 
issued as securities.  Several different securities are created from the same pool of loans because the cash 
flows through a waterfall structure.  In a waterfall structure, a series of tranches with different exposures 
to the risks of the underlying assets are issued.  The cash-flow waterfall allocates the interest and principal 
payments of the underlying collateral pool of debt instruments to the tranches in order of seniority.  For 
example, in a senior-subordinated structure, the senior CMBS debt tranches are paid first, and the 
mezzanine and lower-subordinated notes are paid second and third, respectively.  As a result, the senior 
tranche has less payment risk and receives a higher rating from a rating agency.  The mezzanine and 
lower-subordinated notes are paid last.  If the collateral produces insufficient funds to pay all of the 
tranches, the losses are administered to the lower-subordinated notes first, then the mezzanine.  These 
tranches are therefore more risky, have a lower credit rating and trade at higher yields.  CMBS were 
favored by investors for their risk-mitigating characteristics including built-in diversification and 
overcollateralization.  Overcollateralization is a process in which the total asset pool is larger than the 
total value of the securities issued.  With overcollateralization the first losses are experienced by the 
issuer and the bondholders are not affected.   
 
In 2003 an explosion in CMBS issuance was ignited by the creation of the Collateralized Debt Obligation 
(CDO).2  CDOs, like CMBS, are structured financial products in which a collection of securities are held 
in a trust formed as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) and sold to investors.  CDOs operate in the same 
manner that CMBS operate but often include more risky collateral than traditional CMBS, including 
floating rate commercial real estate loans and construction loans.  The beauty of the CDO from the 
lender’s perspective was that the lower rated, less profitable tranches of several CMBS could be pooled 
into one CDO, and through the perceived reduced risk afforded by the inherent diversification, these 
CDOs were often given AAA or investment grade ratings by the rating agencies.  The ability to convert 
lower rated bonds to AAA through the CDO structure allowed issuers sell more AAA rated assets using 
the same pool of collateral and played a significant role in the volume of commercial real estate loans that 
were issued through the CMBS structure.  The worldwide appetite for securities backed by commercial 
mortgages was tremendous.  Money market funds, pension funds, and many other investment funds 
purchase AAA-rated securities irrespective of the loan collateral.  From their perspective, a AAA-rated 
security is a solid investment regardless of whether that collateral is composed of commercial paper, real 
estate or any other product type.  From 2002 to 2006, issuance for commercial real estate CDOs increased 
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by 281% with a total of $36.6 billion in 2006.9  The appetite for CDOs and other CMBS products 
required an increasing volume of commercial mortgages.  Because the loans were securitized and sold off 
to investors, the originator of the loans had very little balance sheet exposure if the loans ever defaulted.  
This, combined with the need for large volumes of commercial loans, allowed CMBS issuers to relax 
underwriting standards.  
 
CMBS Underwriting 
An analysis of the underwriting of CMBS loans from the Trepp CMBS Deal Library from 2000 to 2008 
illustrates how a purchaser could pay increasingly higher prices for the same real estate while achieving a 
standard target return.  This phenomenon explains the record pricing and transaction volume that 
characterized the 2003 to 2007 bull market and provides valuable insight into the future pricing of 
commercial real estate.   
 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio 
The Debt Service Coverage Ratio 
(“DSCR”) is the basic income-based 
criterion for mortgage underwriting 
and is defined as the collateral 
property’s annual net operating income 
(NOI) divided by the annual debt 
service required by the loan; thus 
DSCR = NOI/DS.5  From 2000 to 
2003, DSCR levels increased steadily 
from 1.60x to 1.98x, then reversed  and 
decreased from 2003 to the low of only 1.45x at the “peak” of the market in 2007. 
YEARS 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
DSCR 1.60 1.66 1.79 1.98 1.85 1.79 1.57 1.45 1.51









2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year
Ratio
Source:  TREPP CMBS Deal Library
Begining
End




The Loan to Value Ratio (“LTV”) is 
the basic asset-value-based 
underwriting criterion and is defined 
as the principal loan amount divided 
by the market value or purchase price 
of the property; thus LTV=L/V.5  
The LTV ratios decreased from 2000 
(68.06%) to 2003 (65.97%) then 
increased substantially from 2003 to 
2007, with CMBS LTV levels at 
69.21% in 2007, the high for this 
period.   
 
Interest Rate 
The decrease in mortgage interest 
rates was supported by the Federal 
Reserve, which under the 
Chairmanship of Alan Greenspan 
reduced the Federal Funds Target 
Rate from 5.98% in January 2001 to 
1.24% in January 2003.  The Federal 
Funds rate is determined largely by 
the purchase and sale of U.S. 
Treasuries and federal agency 
securities, called open market 
operations.  By purchasing large 
amounts of securities the Federal 
Reserve injects cash into the banking 
system and the overall economy.  
The Federal Funds Rate is the 
interest rate that depository 
YEARS 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
LTV 68.06 66.99 66.09 65.97 67.50 67.98 68.21 69.21 68.66











2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
YearSource:  TREPP CMBS Deal Library
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institutions lend overnight federal funds to other depository institutions.  By changing the target Federal 
Funds Rate, the Federal Reserve can increase or decrease the supply of money to the economy.  Lowering 
the Federal Funds, for example, encourages interbank lending and increases the amount of money in the 
economy. By lowering the Federal Funds rate between 2001 and 2003 the Federal Reserve greatly 
increased the capital base in the economy, which decreases the cost of capital and allowed lenders to offer 
mortgages with lower interest rates while still turning a profit.   
 
Underwritten interest rates decreased from 2000 at 8.10% to 2004 at 5.46%, then climbed gradually 
through 2008 at 6.25%.  Similar to the DSCR and LTV ratios, Interest Rates became more aggressive 
(declined) in the early part of the analysis period, however; unlike the DSCR and LTV, interest rate 
underwriting data moderated in 2004 and started to slightly increase through 2008.  This suggests that at 
least one aspect of underwriting was trending in a more moderate manner.  However, the change in 
interest rates is occluded by the emergence of the non-amortizing loan structure that was gaining 
popularity at the same time. 
 
Amortization 
The Interest Only (“IO”) loan structure 
eliminates amortization from the debt 
service calculation.  By eliminating the 
principal portion of the amortized 
payment, the annual debt service for 
the loan is greatly diminished allowing 
a borrower to use increased leverage 
without changing cash flow 
assumptions.  The percentage of loans 
that included IO or partial IO structures 
increased from 8.30% of issuances to 24.60%, a nearly 296% fold increase.  From 2003 to 2007 the 
percentage of IO loans increased to 85.60% of issuances, an additional 347% increase.   
 
Underwriting Conclusion 
The cumulative effect of the above underwriting trends demonstrates that borrowers were able to acquire 
larger loans with lower rates and lower debt service which provided enhanced levered returns without 
changing the cash flow of the underlying asset.  An analysis of the underwriting of CMBS loans from 
2000 to 2008 illustrates how a purchaser could pay increasingly higher prices for the same real estate 
YEARS 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Interest Only % 8.30 8.30 13.10 24.60 47.20 66.20 77.40 85.60 42.30












2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
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while achieving a standard target return.  In most cases the changes in underwriting occurred in 2003, in 
which underwriting became more aggressive, and in 2007, in which underwriting trends reversed 
direction.  These two years can be viewed as the “Beginning” and the “End” of an overall trend in 
commercial mortgage underwriting that coincided with the record pricing and transaction volume that 
characterized the 2003 to 2007 bull market.  Conclusions drawn from this data provides valuable insight 
into the future pricing of commercial real estate.   
 
Analysis 
In this analysis the Trepp CMBS Deal Library was used to 
observe underwriting trends in CMBS loans and observe how 
changes in underwriting affect the cost of capital and the cap 
rates associated with a base case real estate transaction.  This base case (“The Asset”) is a representative 
cash flowing commercial real estate property that is not defined by property type or geographical location.  
It is simply created as a control used to analyze the effects of various leverage scenarios.  In this analysis 
an NOI of $1,000,000 is used with a cap rate of 8.7% and a price of $11,467,890.  The cap rate is equal to 
the 20-year average transaction cap rate from 1983-2002 from NCREIF.  Keeping the cap rate, NOI and 
price steady, loan scenarios are then created for the Asset for years 2002 through 2008 based on the 
underwriting criteria provided by the Trepp CMBS Deal Library.  The LTV and DSCR tests are first 
performed to determine the amount of proceeds, then interest rate and amortization assumptions are used 
to arrive at a debt service, which when subtracted from the NOI, yields the Cash Flow After Debt Service 
(“CFADS”).  The Equity Return is defined as the CFADS / Equity Required.  The analysis assumes that 
IO loan structures are only used in 2006 and 2007.  Additionally, the amount of proceeds is determined 
by the lower of the LTV or the DSCR.  For the purposes of this analysis the LTV ratio was used to 
determine the amount of proceeds in each scenario. 
Base Case Equity Underwriting
Cap Rates 8.72%
NOI ($) 1,000,000              
Value ($) 11,467,890            




The Equity Return represents the cash-on-cash equity return for the first year only.  It does not represent 
an internal rate of return (“IRR”) because it does not account for future cash flows, but it does serve an 
illustrative purpose.  The Equity Returns for the Asset increase 41.1% from the 2002 to 2007 scenarios 
then drop sharply after 2007 to a rate that is below the 2003 return.  This example illustrates how leverage 













This analysis would suggest that equity returns for real estate were more attractive in the later years.  In 
reality, investors during this period were bidding for assets in a competitive market.  Because investors 
often kept return requirements steady, the lower cost of capital allowed them to bid up the asking price of 
the assets while achieving the target return. 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Debt Underwriting
DSCR 1.79 1.98 1.85 1.79 1.57 1.45 1.51
LTV 66.09 65.97 67.50 67.98 68.21 69.21 68.66
Rate 6.60% 5.75% 5.46% 5.53% 5.96% 5.83% 6.25%
Amortization Yes Yes Yes Yes IO IO Yes
Debt  Constant 7.7% 7.0% 6.8% 6.8% 6.0% 5.8% 7.4%
Equity Underwriting
Cap Rates 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72%
NOI ($) 1,000,000           1,000,000           1,000,000           1,000,000           1,000,000     1,000,000      1,000,000     
Value ($) 11,467,890         11,467,890         11,467,890         11,467,890         11,467,890   11,467,890    11,467,890   
Pricing and Proceeds
LT V Proceeds 7,579,128           7,565,367           7,740,826           7,795,872           7,822,248     7,936,927      7,873,853     
DSCR Proceeds 7,289,484           7,212,046           7,968,599           8,172,225           10,686,958   11,829,420    8,963,147     
Levered Equity Required 3,888,761           3,902,523           3,727,064           3,672,018           3,645,642     3,530,963      3,594,037     
Debt Service 580,857              529,793              525,090              532,931              466,206        462,723         581,768        
CFADS 419,143              470,207              474,910              467,069              533,794        537,277         418,232        
DSCR 558,659              505,051              540,541              558,659              636,943        689,655         662,252        
Equity Return 10.78% 12.05% 12.74% 12.72% 14.64% 15.22% 11.64%
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Assuming an investor is solving for the 2002 levered equity return of 10.78%, one can observe how 
















In the above analysis the cap rates for the asset 
were changed in years 2003 to 2008 to arrive at 
the same equity return as 2002.  The impact on 
cap rates is significant with cap rates falling 136 
basis points to a “peak” cap rate of 7.4% in 2007.  
The whole price increases from $11.5 million to 
$13.6 million, a 18.6% increase over 2002 
pricing.  Additionally, in 2008, when 
underwriting criteria tightens, the price must 
revert to pre-2003 levels.   
 
The above analysis suggests that based on debt 
underwriting from 2002 to 2008, if valuation is 
derived from the cost of capital, then cap rates 
should have decreased through 2007, then 
increased in 2008.  Actual data from NCREIF 
Transaction Cap Rates
















2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
8.8% 7.8% 7.1% 6.3% 6.0% 5.8% 6.5%
















2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
8.7% 8.3% 8.1% 8.1% 7.5% 7.4% 8.5%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Debt Underwriting
DSCR 1.79 1.98 1.85 1.79 1.57 1.45 1.51
LTV 66.09 65.97 67.50 67.98 68.21 69.21 68.66
Rate 6.60% 5.75% 5.46% 5.53% 5.96% 5.83% 6.25%
Amortization Yes Yes Yes Yes IO IO Yes
Debt  Constant 7.7% 7.0% 6.8% 6.8% 6.0% 5.8% 7.4%
Equity Underwriting
Cap Rates 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72%
NOI ($) 1,000,000           1,000,000           1,000,000           1,000,000           1,000,000     1,000,000      1,000,000     
Value ($) 11,467,890         11,467,890         11,467,890         11,467,890         11,467,890   11,467,890    11,467,890   
Pricing and Proceeds
LT V Proceeds 7,579,128           7,565,367           7,740,826           7,795,872           7,822,248     7,936,927      7,873,853     
DSCR Proceeds 7,289,484           7,212,046           7,968,599           8,172,225           10,686,958   11,829,420    8,963,147     
Levered Equity Required 3,888,761           3,902,523           3,727,064           3,672,018           3,645,642     3,530,963      3,594,037     
Debt Service 580,857              529,793              525,090              532,931              466,206        462,723         581,768        
CFADS 419,143              470,207              474,910              467,069              533,794        537,277         418,232        
DSCR 558,659              505,051              540,541              558,659              636,943        689,655         662,252        
Equity Return 10.78% 12.05% 12.74% 12.72% 14.64% 15.22% 11.64%
Cap Rate Adjusment to Arrive at 
Target Equity Return 8.72% 8.29% 8.08% 8.10% 7.49% 7.36% 8.45%
Adjusted Value 11,467,890 12,064,181 12,374,706 12,345,679 13,345,789 13,596,193 11,834,320
% Change 0.0% 5.2% 7.9% 7.7% 16.4% 18.6% 3.2%
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supports this thesis.  According to NCREIF 4 Quarter Moving Average Cap Rates move in a similar 
manner to those of the analysis.   
 
Contrary to the Modigliani-Miller Proposition I Theorem, which states that in an efficient market the 
value of an investment is unaffected by how that investment is financed, the Trepp Analysis suggests that 
pricing for commercial real estate ( as evidenced by cap rates) is highly dependent on financing and the 
cost of capital.  The theorem only holds true in absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and asymmetric 
information.  Because this situation never occurs in reality, the theorem is designed to highlight the 
factors that cause discrepancy in pricing. The reason that results of the Trepp Analysis are contrary to the 
theorem is that lenders did not adequately price the risk associated with real estate.  The Trepp Analysis 
indicates that during the 2003-2007 bull market, lenders assumed attributed too little risk to real estate 
and provided an abundance of mispriced, inexpensive debt.  
 
Illiquidity 
Within the context of today’s “credit crisis,” leveraged returns and cap rate compression have important 
implications for both borrowers and lenders.  Based on the Trepp data, CMBS loan originations came to a 
screeching halt in 2008.  Investor concerns about the quality of the underlying loans caused CMBS 
spreads to widen out to their highest spreads in history making it unprofitable to issue additional CMBS 
paper.  Originations dropped from $134.1 billion to $1.4 billion.  The “credit crisis” is in reality a 
“liquidity crisis.”  CMBS lenders were not the only lenders in the bull market of 2003 to 2007, but they 
did constitute about 45% of originations.  Other lenders including Commercial Banks, Investment Funds 























2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
YearSource:  TREPP CMBS Deal Library
Begining
End
YEARS 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Current Bal (000s) 13,470,721 21,494,435 22,813,177 39,061,096 64,509,155 126,588,818 152,079,072 134,099,747 1,430,585
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While inexpensive capital has evaporated, investor’s required yields have not changed.  If one continues 
the analysis and assumes a “Worst Case Scenario” for 2009 that there is zero available debt, the result is 
profound.  Without a liquid debt market investors would look to purchase assets with all cash.  Solving 
for a 10.78% equity return, on a $1,000,000 NOI, investors would use a 10.78% cap rate. 
 
The resulting price of $9.3 million is a 31.77% discount to the 2007 “peak” pricing of $13.7 million.  
Levered equity returns are affected more dramatically, with equity loss between 56% and 63% for all 





From a borrower’s perspective, a 60% loss of equity is a devastating return, but the lender is  insulated 
from loss due to the low level of proceeds that were issued.   
 
Up to this point the analysis has assumed that investors would be willing to invest in real estate on an all 
cash basis.  From 2007 to 2009 the equity required to purchase the Asset increases 239% from $3.8 
million to $9.3 million.  Additionally, up to this point the analysis has assumed that equity return 
requirements have been stable at 10.72%.  In the context of the “credit crunch," the current recession, and 
pricing indicated by the analysis above, it has become clear that commercial real estate as an asset class is 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
% Change to Current (Worst Case) -19.11% -23.11% -25.04% -24.86% -30.49% -31.77% -21.61%
% EquityRequired (1 - LTV) 33.91% 34.03% 32.50% 32.02% 31.79% 30.79% 31.34%
Levered Equity Loss -56.35% -56.15% -58.80% -59.68% -60.11% -62.06% -60.97%




DSCR 1.79 1.98 1.85 1.79 1.57 1.45 1.51 0.00
LTV 66.09 65.97 67.50 67.98 68.21 69.21 68.66 0.00
Rate 6.60% 5.75% 5.46% 5.53% 5.96% 5.83% 6.25% 0.00%
Amortization Yes Yes Yes Yes IO IO Yes -
Debt  Constant 7.7% 7.0% 6.8% 6.8% 6.0% 5.8% 7.4% 0.0%
Equity Underwriting
Cap Rates 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 10.78%
NOI ($) 1,000,000           1,000,000           1,000,000           1,000,000           1,000,000     1,000,000      1,000,000     1,000,000                     
Value ($) 11,467,890         11,467,890         11,467,890         11,467,890         11,467,890   11,467,890    11,467,890   9,276,438                     
Pricing and Proceeds
LT V Proceeds 7,579,128           7,565,367           7,740,826           7,795,872           7,822,248     7,936,927      7,873,853     -                                
DSCR Proceeds 7,289,484           7,212,046           7,968,599           8,172,225           10,686,958   11,829,420    8,963,147     -
Levered Equity Required 3,888,761           3,902,523           3,727,064           3,672,018           3,645,642     3,530,963      3,594,037     9,276,438                     
Debt Service 580,857              529,793              525,090              532,931              466,206        462,723         581,768        -                                
CFADS 419,143              470,207              474,910              467,069              533,794        537,277         418,232        1,000,000                     
DSCR 558,659              505,051              540,541              558,659              636,943        689,655         662,252        
Equity Return 10.78% 12.05% 12.74% 12.72% 14.64% 15.22% 11.64% 10.78%
Cap Rate Adjusment to Arrive at 
Target Equity Return 8.72% 8.29% 8.08% 8.10% 7.49% 7.36% 8.45% 10.78%
Adjusted Value 11,467,890 12,064,181 12,374,706 12,345,679 13,345,789 13,596,193 11,834,320 9,276,438
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subject to wild swings in pricing and is therefore more risky.  To assume more risk requires greater equity 
returns.  So how will commercial real estate equity be priced going forward? 
 
The recession has created tremendous uncertainty in commercial real estate underwriting.  As companies 
contract, the demand for space will shrink putting downward pressure on occupancy and rental rates.  
How long the recession will last and how far it will drag down real estate fundamentals is a guessing 
game.  Unlike stocks or bonds which trade in an open market and are priced continuously, real estate is an 
illiquid asset.  It may take years for enough trades to occur before a “market” cap rate or yield is 
established.  One way to estimate the future equity returns requirements for commercial real estate is to 
price the returns of other currently traded real estate related investments.  The CMBS market can provide 
insight into the returns that investors now seek for real estate risk.   
 
The AAA Super Senior bond is a subset of the AAA rated class and is senior to all other classes with 
respect to repayment and loss.  The Super Senior bond is the least risky CMBS investment that an 
investor can purchase.  Super Senior spreads began to widen in early 2008 and “blew out” in late 
September of 2008 after Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy.  As of April 3, 2009, AAA Super Senior 
CMBS spreads were trading at 1,021 basis points over the 10-year United States Treasury rates of 291 
basis points.  As of April 3, 2009, a CMBS investor is therefore expecting a 13.12% return for the least 
risky CMBS tranche, which is credit rated, and has the built in protection of diversification and 
overcollateralization.  Additionally, CMBS represents an investment in mortgages which is the lowest 
risk portion of the capital stack in any real estate structure.  Despite these cumulative risk mitigating 
characteristics, these bonds are trading at rates that are higher than the NCREIF 20-Year Average Cap 
Rate of 8.72%. 
 
Investors have different 
motivations for investing in 
mortgage backed securities 
versus direct investment in real 
estate.  Direct investors may be 
motivated by the potential 
“upside” of increasing cash flows 
through leasing, management or 
changes in the capital markets.  
A CMBS investor, on the other 
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hand may seek the risk mitigating factors previously discussed and the increased liquidity afforded by a 
publicly traded bond.  For the purpose of the analysis, the Super Senior AAA CMBS spreads provide at 
least one real estate-related barometer with which to estimate expected equity returns.  If an assumption is 




In this scenario, an investor would be investing $7.6 million to acquire the Asset on an all-cash basis and 
would receive an equity return of 13.12%.  When compared to the pricing scenarios for years 2002 
through 2007, this pricing represents a 46.32% decline in asset pricing from “peak” 2007 pricing, a near 
complete elimination of all equity in all scenarios, and a moderate impairment to most of the underlying 




The implication for real estate owners is staggering.  This analysis implies that any principal that 
purchased a commercial real estate property between the years of 2002 and 2007 would be effectively 
“wiped out” if they tried to sell the assets in today’s environment.  Given the record transaction volume 
that occurred in these years, the total value of real estate equity that has evaporated it substantial.  If one 
takes the total transaction volume that occurred from 2002 to 2008 and applies a Trepp LTV Ratios for 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
% Change to Current (Worst Case) -33.54% -36.82% -38.41% -38.26% -42.89% -43.94% -35.59%
% EquityRequired (1 - LTV) 33.91% 34.03% 32.50% 32.02% 31.79% 30.79% 31.34%
Levered Equity Loss -98.90% -98.55% -103.19% -104.74% -105.49% -108.92% -107.01%
Loan Impairment 0.00% 0.00% -1.54% -2.23% -2.56% -3.97% -3.20%




DSCR 1.79 1.98 1.85 1.79 1.57 1.45 1.51 0.00
LTV 66.09 65.97 67.50 67.98 68.21 69.21 68.66 0.00
Rate 6.60% 5.75% 5.46% 5.53% 5.96% 5.83% 6.25% 0.00%
Amortization Yes Yes Yes Yes IO IO Yes -
Debt  Constant 7.7% 7.0% 6.8% 6.8% 6.0% 5.8% 7.4% 0.0%
Equity Underwriting
Cap Rates 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 13.12%
NOI ($) 1,000,000           1,000,000           1,000,000           1,000,000           1,000,000     1,000,000      1,000,000     1,000,000                     
Value ($) 11,467,890         11,467,890         11,467,890         11,467,890         11,467,890   11,467,890    11,467,890   7,621,951                     
Pricing and Proceeds
LT V Proceeds 7,579,128           7,565,367           7,740,826           7,795,872           7,822,248     7,936,927      7,873,853     -                                
DSCR Proceeds 7,289,484           7,212,046           7,968,599           8,172,225           10,686,958   11,829,420    8,963,147     -
Levered Equity Required 3,888,761           3,902,523           3,727,064           3,672,018           3,645,642     3,530,963      3,594,037     7,621,951                     
Debt Service 580,857              529,793              525,090              532,931              466,206        462,723         581,768        -                                
CFADS 419,143              470,207              474,910              467,069              533,794        537,277         418,232        1,000,000                     
DSCR 558,659              505,051              540,541              558,659              636,943        689,655         662,252        
Equity Return 10.78% 12.05% 12.74% 12.72% 14.64% 15.22% 11.64% 13.12%
Cap Rate Adjusment to Arrive at 
Target Equity Return 8.72% 8.29% 8.08% 8.10% 7.49% 7.36% 8.45% 13.12%
Adjusted Value 11,467,890 12,064,181 12,374,706 12,345,679 13,345,789 13,596,193 11,834,320 7,621,951
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the same period one arrives at an implied equity investment.  The total equity investment for the period of 










This analysis assumes that each transaction was unique and that the same buildings were not traded within 
these years.  In reality most buildings were traded or flipped several times within this period.   
 
The greater implication of the analysis is that equity owners, regardless of who was left holding the asset 
have been wiped out due to a lack of liquidity and a change in pricing.  This will create a sea change 
within the real estate industry as ownership transfers from traditional principals including opportunity 
funds, core funds, pension funds, developers and entrepreneurs, to holders of the debt such as banks, life 
companies and debt funds.  There is the possibility that owners with negative equity will continue to 
manage the property and hold out for a change in the capital markets and a change in liquidity, but 
previous research suggests that negative equity is one of the primary motivations for foreclosure.   
 
Several studies have been conducted on the events that trigger default.  Two primary factors contribute to 
an event of default: decreased cash flow or an inability to serve the debt, and negative equity.  In the first 
study on default risk assessment of commercial mortgages, Vandell (1984) hypothesizes that default 
could be due to the occurrence of either adverse cash flow or negative equity in the property.3  Vandell’s 
study recognizes both the interactions between cash flow and equity conditions in affecting default risk, 
and the need to consider the timing of default and to incorporate the time-varying information about the 
property, market, and economic conditions.  Vandell later (1992) carried out an empirical study using 
aggregate commercial mortgage foreclosure experience and confirmed the equity theory of default.3  
Essentially, when the market price of a property has fallen to such a degree that the borrower no longer 
has any possibility of recognizing a profit, the borrower defaults.  Vandell, Barnes, Hartzell, Kraft and 
Wendt (1993) were the first to use loan-level commercial mortgage data from a large life-insurance 
company.3  Empirical results confirm the dominance of loan terms and property pricing trends in affecting 
default.3  A study by Chen (2004) found that borrowers are likely to make default decisions based upon 
both the equity position relative to the mortgage and the cash flow condition as indicated by the space 
market movement, indicating that negative equity and the ability to pay appear to co-exist in the default 
Year
Real Capital Analytics 
Transaction Volume Trepp LTV Ratios Equity
2002 $102,287,600,747 66.1% $102,287,600,747
2003 $122,537,988,009 66.0% $41,699,677,319
2004 $204,551,974,706 67.5% $66,479,391,779
2005 $281,256,419,747 68.0% $90,058,305,603
2006 $330,038,484,941 68.2% $104,919,234,363
2007 $440,490,820,035 69.2% $135,627,123,489
2008 $134,120,098,950 68.7% $42,033,239,011
$1,615,283,387,135 $583,104,572,312
Source: Real Capital Analytics / Trepp
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process of commercial mortgages.  Chen (2004) also found that real estate market variables, such as 
market-level vacancy rates, provide very useful information in explaining commercial mortgage defaults.  
In today’s economic environment, vacancy and rental rates are already showing signs of decline.  
According to the CoStar National Office statistics, between the first and fourth quarter of 2008, vacancy 
rates increased from 11.30% to 12.00% while average asking rental rates decreased from $25.30 to 
$25.00.  These trends are projected to continue in 2009. 





Equity holders are not the only groups affected by the change in pricing.  Lenders in all categories are 
projected to experience loss of proceeds as well.  By subtracting the 2009 price from the proceeds for 
each year and dividing the product by the 2009 price one arrives at a Loan Impairment Factor, which 
indicates the percentage loss that each loan scenario would encounter if the Asset for that year was 
marked to market.   
 
Loan Impairment Factor =     - X Year Proceeds – 2009 Price 
                  2009 Price 
 
Taking that Loan Impairment Factor and applying it to the total CMBS Originations provides some 
indication of the magnitude of CMBS loss that would occur if the underlying assets were marked to 
market in an illiquid capital markets environment with equity requirements of 13.12%.  Based on these 
assumptions the total CMBS loss for 2002 – 2008 originations would amount to nearly $13.1 billion 
dollars.   
 
 
Assuming further that other classes of real estate lenders had similar underwriting practices through the 
analysis period, and knowing that CMBS lenders only contributed roughly 45% of originations during 
this period, one could make the very rough assumption that, if one were to mark all real estate debt to 
market the total loss would exceed $29 billion.  This does not account for lost equity positions, bridge 
loans, or mezzanine debt.  Again, the analysis assumes that each transaction is unique, when in reality 
many assets were traded multiple times, in which case the debt was paid off.   
Loan Impairment 0.00% 0.00% -1.54% -2.23% -2.56% -3.97% -3.20%
CMBS Originations ( $000's) 22,813,177 39,061,096 64,509,155 126,588,818 152,079,072 134,099,747 1,430,585
Estimated Securitized Real Estate Valu 0 0 -990,655 -2,824,106 -3,894,137 -5,321,722 -45,768
Total ( $000's) 2002 - 2008 -13,076,389
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Scenario 2 – Limited Debt 
Assuming that there will be no debt available in 2009 
may be too drastic although recent data indicates that 
available debt will be greatly constrained.  Conduits 
(defined by the Mortgage Bankers Association as 
CMBS, collateralized debt obligations “CDO” and 
other asset-backed security “ABS” issuers) were the 
largest originators of commercial real estate debt from 
2005 to 2007 constituting between 44% and 48% of 
total originations.  According to the Mortgage 
Bankers Association’s (MBA) Quarterly Survey of 
Commercial/Multifamily Mortgage Bankers 
Originations, Conduit originations for CMBS saw a decrease of 98% compared to the fourth quarter of 
2007.8  For the  second largest originators of loans, commercial banks and thrifts, which  originated 20% - 
22% of real estate debt from 2005 to 2007, there was an 86% decrease in loans for commercial bank 
portfolios.  For life insurance companies, which constituted 9% – 13% of all originations between 2005 
and 2007, there was a 73% decrease in loan originations.  Conduits Data before 2005 was not available to 
the author and 2008 data has not yet been released.  Originations from the three largest lender groups, 
which constituted a combined 78% of total origination volume between 2005 and 2007 had declined by 
91% by year end 2008.  Dollar volume of loans for Government Sponsored Enterprises (or GSEs – 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) saw a decrease of 16%.  Lending has not vanished completely, but is has 
been severely constrained.   
 
Returning to the Trepp Analysis, if a conservative assumption is made that that only limited debt is 
available going forward (40% LTV), using 2002 interest rates of 6.60%, and equity return requirements 
are 13.12%, equity investors still loose the majority of their investments.   
Annual Origination Volume by Issuer Type 2005 - 2007 (%)
2005 2006 2007
Conduit 47.64% 45.71% 44.35%
Commercial bank & thrifts 20.16% 21.12% 21.37%
Life insurance company 12.97% 12.25% 9.64%
Other 6.94% 6.75% 8.96%
Fannie Mae 4.52% 3.96% 3.80%
REITs & Investment Funds 2.49% 2.61% 3.41%
Freddie Mac 2.60% 2.42% 3.02%
Specialty finance company 0.14% 1.80% 2.34%
Credit companies 0.00% 1.66% 2.08%
Pension Fund 1.56% 0.93% 0.55%
FHA/Ginnie Mae 0.97% 0.79% 0.49%
Source: MBA - Annual Origination Volume Summation 2005 - 2007
Average Issuance 
(% of total) 2007 - 2008 Decline
Conduit 45.90% 98.00%
Commercial bank & thrifts 20.89% 86.00%
Life insurance company 11.62% 73.00%
78.41% 91.10%
Source: MBA - Annual Origination Volume Summation 2005 - 2007
Annual Origination Volume by Issuer Type 2005 - 2007 (%)




In this scenario, the cap rate must approach 11% resulting in a 33% decline in Asset price from the 2007 
peak.  The underlying loans are not impaired directly, but the equity investors loose between 69% and 
65% of their investment.  When the opportunity for profit has been eliminated and an investor has lost the 
majority of their investment, the underlying property is at a much higher risk for default.   
 
Implications 
The two Trepp Analysis scenarios are given to illustrate pricing in a totally illiquid environment and an 
environment with limited liquidity.  The reality of the current capital market is probably somewhere in 
between.  The debt origination research by the Mortgage Bankers Association, suggest that the current 
situation is probably closer to the first scenario than the second.  In both scenarios, changes in the cost of 
capital have a dramatic effect on pricing suggesting that commercial real estate pricing is a byproduct of 
the cost of capital.   
 
Much ink is spilled over the movement of cap rates and decreases in occupancy and market rents, but 
there are still groups that believe that there has been a “paradigm shift” in the way commercial real estate 
is priced, and that “cap rate compression” is a permanent result of the recent bull market.  Increased 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
% Change to Current (Limited Debt) -20.00% -24.51% -26.38% -26.24% -31.79% -33.03% -22.98%
% EquityRequired (1 - LTV) 33.91% 34.03% 32.50% 32.02% 31.79% 30.79% 31.34%
Levered Equity Loss -58.98% -58.77% -61.54% -62.46% -62.91% -64.96% -63.82%
Loan Impairment 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%




LTV (%) 66.09 65.97 67.50 67.98 68.21 69.21 68.66 40.00
Rate 6.60% 5.75% 5.46% 5.53% 5.96% 5.83% 6.25% 6.60%
Amortization Yes Yes Yes Yes IO IO Yes Yes
Debt  Constant 7.7% 7.0% 6.8% 6.8% 6.0% 5.8% 7.4% 7.7%
Equity Underwriting
Cap Rates 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72% 10.9%
NOI ($) 1,000,000           1,000,000           1,000,000           1,000,000           1,000,000     1,000,000      1,000,000     1,000,000               
Value ($) 11,467,890         11,467,890         11,467,890         11,467,890         11,467,890   11,467,890    11,467,890   9,140,768               
Pricing and Proceeds
LT V Proceeds 7,579,128           7,565,367           7,740,826           7,795,872           7,822,248     7,936,927      7,873,853     3,656,307               
Levered Equity Required 3,888,761           3,902,523           3,727,064           3,672,018           3,645,642     3,530,963      3,594,037     5,484,461               
Debt Service 580,857              529,793              525,090              532,931              466,206        462,723         581,768        280,216                  
CFADS 419,143              470,207              474,910              467,069              533,794        537,277         418,232        719,784                  
DSCR 558,659              505,051              540,541              558,659              636,943        689,655         662,252        250,000                  
Equity Return 10.78% 12.05% 12.74% 12.72% 14.64% 15.22% 11.64% 13.12%
Cap Rate Adjusment to Arrive at 
Target Equity Return 8.72% 8.23% 8.03% 8.04% 7.44% 7.30% 8.40% 10.90%
Adjusted Value 11,467,890 12,153,622 12,461,059 12,437,811 13,449,899 13,698,630 11,911,852 9,174,312
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transparency and reliable and readily available data are credited with reducing some of the uncertainties 
that required real estate to trade at a cap rate that is higher than 8.5% for many decades. 
 
Leverage, is not a new concept and most practitioners understand that leverage increases the volatility of 
returns.  As the Trepp Analysis illustrated, the equity positions in the scenarios that had high levels of 
debt were the ones that were most dramatically affected by changes in pricing.  But the role of leverage in 
asset pricing is widely misunderstood by people in and outside of the real estate industry.  Actions by the 
Federal Government are evidence of this lack of understanding.  In April, 2004 the Securities and 
Exchange Commission changed leveraged regulations for five investment banks (Lehman Brothers, Bear 
Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley).  Since 1975 the SEC had required these 
investment banks to maintain leverage ratios of 12-to-1 (92.3%) to insure against losses on their 
investments.  The change in 2004, named the net capital rule, allowed the banks to increase their amount 
of leverage up to 40-to-1 (97.6%).  According to Stephan Labaton of the New York Times, the meeting in 
which the decision was made lasted 55 minutes and the vote to approve the change was unanimous.  
When the credit crisis hit, the price of the bank’s assets plummeted in the same way that the price of the 
Asset tumbled in the Trepp Analysis.  Bear Stearns was sold to JP Morgan Chase, Merrill Lynch was sold 
to Bank of America, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley were converted to commercial banks.   
 
Leverage continues to shape public policy and is designed to play a major role in the current bailout 
efforts by the federal government.  To address concerns about the current financial crisis the federal 
government has created a stable of programs designed to stabilize the market using federal funds.  On 
October 3, 2008, the Government enacted the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which 
authorized the United States Secretary of the Treasury to spend up to $700 billion to purchase distressed 
assets from the banking system to strengthen bank balance sheets which and was named the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP).  On November 25, 2008, the US Federal Reserve announced the Term 
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) which was originally intended to provide low-cost 
financing to new issuance of asset backed securities (ASB) including securities collateralized by student 
loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and loans guaranteed by the Small Business Association (SBA) and 
was recently amended to allow leverage to purchase existing issuances.  The TALF structure involves the 
Federal Reserve Board to New York (FRBNY) lending up to $1 trillion on a non-recourse basis to holders 
of AAA-rated backed by newly originated consumer and business loans.  On March 23, 2009, the 
Government announced the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) to buy assets from bank’s balance 
sheets.  The PPIP is the first program to specifically target commercial real estate.  




The primary areas of focus for the government’s troubled legacy asset programs are residential and 
commercial mortgages in the form of both whole loans and securitizations that have real estate loans as 
collateral.  The program is designed to help all owners of these assets including those that predominantly 
hold them in the form of loans, such as banks, and those that hold securities, such as insurers, pension 
funds, mutual funds and individual retirement accounts.  The program is composed of two sub-programs: 
the Legacy Loans Program and the Legacy Securities Program.  The Legacy Loans Program uses an 
FDIC guarantee of debt financing with equity capital from the private sector and the Treasury to support 
the purchase of troubled loans from insured depository institutions.  The Legacy Securities Program 
combines financing from the Federal Reserve and the Treasury with equity capital from the private sector 
to address the problem of troubled securities.    
 
Through the use of leverage, the programs are designed to assist private capital in the pricing and 
purchasuing of these assets.  By co-investing with private capital the government seeks to maximize and 
protect its return to the taxpayer.  11 
 
Legacy Loans Program 
The program is projected to attract private capital to purchase loan assets from participation banks 
through FDIC debt guarantees and Treasury equity co-investment.  The program is intended to boost 
private demand for distressed assets that are currently held by banks and facilitate market-priced sales of 
troubled assets.  First the banks identify the loans they would like to sell, the FDIC then holds an auction 
and an asset pool of loans is purchased by a Public-Private Investment Funds (“PPIF’s”).  The FDIC 
oversees the formation, funding and operation of PPIFs that will purchase assets from banks.  The FDIC 
guarantees a debt amount of 6:1 (85.7% leverage), then the Treasury and an equity investor take 50/50 
positions in the equity.   
 
Legacy Securities Program 
The Legacy Securities Program is aimed at AAA CMBS and RMBS originally rated AAA that was issued 
before January 1, 2009.  Similar to the Legacy Loans Program the Legacy Securities Program is designed 
to bring private investment to the market through government backed leverage.  The Treasury first 
approves five fund managers to raise capital to invest in pools of securities.  The Treasury and private 
investors would then invest in the asset pools on a 1:1 basis.  The Treasury would also provide senior debt 
in the amount of 50% of the total equity capital in the fund.  The senior debt will have the same duration 
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as the underlying fund and will be repaid on a pro-rata basis as principal repayments or disposition 
proceeds are realized by the PPIF.   
 
Legacy Loans Analysis  
The success of the Legacy Loans program is contingent on pricing.  
The program was put in place to bridge the bid-ask spread between 
banks and investors and to spark transactions and jumpstart the 
market.  As was observed in the Trepp analysis, pricing is a result 
of the cost of capital.  The government has not given any indication 
of the cost of the debt they will be issuing and it is not yet clear 
what returns potential investors will seek to purchase the assets.  An 
analysis of the structure provides a range of results that provide an 
indication of future pricing.  The analysis assumes a loan amount of $100, an interest rate of 5.83%, 
which is the 2007 interest rate from the Trepp Analysis, a required equity rate of return of 15%, the 6:1 
(85.7% LTV) government funded debt, and a 5% cost of debt (interest only).  The price for the $100 asset 
using these assumptions is $91, which equates to a 9.3% discount.  These assumptions are a complete 












The yellow highlighted area indicates prices at which banks would have to take a discount.  There is no 
guarantee that banks would be willing to sell performing loans at any discount at all.  In April 2, 2009 the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board enacted FASB 157-e which relaxes fair-value rules on mark-to-
market accounting requirements, allowing banks to keep performing loans on their books for the term of 
the loan.  Typically, banks don not mark illiquid assets like real estate loans to market on a continual 








Cost of Debt 5.0%
Weighted Cost of Capital 6.4%
Total Price ($) 91
Assumptions
Cost of Debt
90.7 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
12% 219 166 133 112 96 84
13% 208 159 129 108 93 82
14% 197 153 125 105 91 80
15% 188 147 121 103 89 79
16% 179 142 117 100 87 77
17% 171 137 114 98 85 76
18% 164 132 111 95 83 74
19% 157 128 108 93 82 73
20% 151 124 105 91 80 72
21% 145 120 102 89 78 70
22% 140 116 99 87 77 69
23% 135 113 97 85 75 68
24% 131 110 94 83 74 67
25% 127 107 92 81 73 66









Asset Pricing, Leverage and the Bull Market of 2003 - 2007 
 26
under par would result in future losses that banks are trying to avoid.  It is therefore unlikely that banks 
will want to sell performing assets for any discount.  The analysis above indicates that the cost of debt 
will need to be extremely low, (below 4%) to incentivize private capital to enter the market.   
 
Both programs are predicated on the use of leverage.  In an ironic twist the government is using the same 
mechanism to solve the problem that created the problem in the first place: abundant low cost capital.  
Although pricing of the debt has not been announced, it is clear that if the program is going to be 
successful it will need to include abundant amounts of cheap debt.  Doesn’t that put us back where we 
were to start with?  Is it possible for the government to be the bank of choice for all of these new 
investors?  Currently the program only extends to December 2009.  What happens when the leverage is 
gone?  Will the market then be “stabilized” or is it expected that there will be another “paradigm shift” in 
valuation?  What bank can afford to step into the shoes of the government when the debt expires?  The 
program also assumes that investors are interested in taking equity positions in highly leveraged 
structures.  Based on the current structure private investment will need to participate in a first loss 
position.  This is a risky position to be in.  Most investors are still licking their wounds from their last 
round of investments.  There is also significant uncertainty in having the government as a partner.  What 
controls will they exert?  What if the private partner starts to make too much money?  Is there a 
possibility that their compensation could be capped retroactively in a scenario similar to the compensation 
of AIG employees?   
 
Conclusion and Projection 
 
Near term defaults have become a large source of concern amid the illiquidity of the market.  Billion of 
dollars of real estate loans will become due in the next five years.  According to Wachovia Capital 
Markets, LLC, $240 billion of commercial mortgage debt will mature in 2009, $49 billion of which will 
be in CMBS.12  This estimate includes $23 billion fixed-rate loans, which are reaching maturity dates and 
$27 billion floating rate loans which are reaching their first maturity date.  
 
The Trepp Analysis suggests that with the upward shift of cap rates, the potential for future mortgage 
defaults is high.  As a result of the real estate downturn of the late 1980s to early 1990s, commercial 
mortgage default rates reached extremely high levels throughout the country.  The life insurance industry 
reported the highest outstanding foreclosure rate of 7.53% in the second quarter of 1992 (ACLI), and 
commercial banks reported the delinquent rate of commercial mortgages as 12.57% in the first quarter of 
1991 per the Federal Reserve Board.3  Not all delinquencies; however, result in foreclosure and sale. In a 
CMBS structure a “master servicer” is put in place to oversee the administration of the underlying loans 
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and the distribution of the cash flows to the tranche investors.4  One of these functions involves the 
administration and disposition of troubled loans.  When a loan in a CMBS deal fails to perform as 
expected, the master servicer sends the loan to a “special servicer.”  The special servicer has the power to 
foreclose on the loan or modify the loan terms in an effort to maximize the cash flows to the CMBS 
investors.8  Due to the illiquid nature of commercial real estate, borrowers are unlikely to dispose of the 
properties quickly to meet the cash payment requirements even if the market value of collateral is higher 
than the mortgage principal amount.5 
 
Loan modifications will be the likely result of near term maturities.  If banks choose to foreclose and sell 
assets they will most likely need to swallow pricing discounts similar to what was shown on the Trepp 
Analysis (44% from 2007 to 2008).  Recent transactions are proving this theory out.  In a foreclosure 
auction in late March of 2009, John Hancock Tower in Boston, Massachusetts, was purchased for $640.5 
million.  The purchaser paid $20.1 million to acquire the mezzanine debt and assumed the senior debt for 
a total transaction price of $640.6 million, a 50.7% discount from the 2006 purchase price of $1.3 billion.   
 
The current commercial real estate market is awash in uncertainty.  Both investors and sellers are unsure 
of how to price commercial real estate.  An illiquid debt market combined with a suffering economy has 
created a situation in which all but the most opportunistic investors are avoiding transactions.  The Trepp 
Analysis suggests that cap rates will increase and real estate could sell at prices that are roughly half of 
their peak pricing.  The John Hancock Tower transaction mentioned above provides a real-time example 
of scenario playing out in the market.  Near term maturities may force distressed sales, but special 
servicers and lenders will most likely choose to extend the terms of performing loans to avoid realizing 
losses in today’s economic environment.  The benefits of the PPIP programs are difficult to forecast 
without knowledge of the cost of the financing that the government will provide.  It can be predicted; 
however, that for the program to work, the cost of financing will need to be inexpensive.  This raises a 
host of questions on the merits of solving a problem created by leverage with the use of leverage.  
Undoubtedly, leverage helped facilitate the current problem, whether leverage will help solve it remains 
to be seen.  Most likely, commercial real estate pricing will return to pre-2003 levels, a time when debt 
underwriting was more “conservative” and commercial real estate was trading at cap rates more 
consistent with the 20-year average.  As the Trepp analysis shows, if pricing returns to pre-2003 levels 
there will be significant losses in the near term. 





1. Fabozzi, Frank J., David P Jacob., and Jesse M Abraham, “The Handbook of Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securities”, John Wiley and Sons, 1998. 
 
2. Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association.  Global CDO Issuance Data. 
 
3. Chen, Jun, and Yongheng Deng (2004), Commercial Mortgage Workout Strategy and 
Conditional Default Probability:  Evidence from Special Serviced CMBS Loans.  Research Paper 
Submitted to the Real Estate Research Institute (RERI).   
 
4. Ambrose, Brent W., Abdullah Yavas, and Anthony B. Sanders (2008), CMBS Special Servicers 
and Adverse Selection in Commercial Mortgage Markets: Theory and Evidence.  Research Paper 
Submitted to the Real Estate Research Institute (RERI). 
 
5. Geltner, David M., Norman G. Miller, Jim Clayton and Piet Eichholtz, “Commercial Real Estate 
Analysis & Investments”, Thomson South-Western, 2001. 
 
6. Lebaton, Stephen (2008), “Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt”, The New York 
Times. 
 
7. Trepp CMBS Deal Library – Trepp, LLC. 
 
8. Staiger, Roger (2009), “Discount Rate, Capitalization Rate, Valuation”, Edward St. John 
Department of Real Estate, Carey Business School. 
 
9. Mortgage Banker Association (2009), “Commercial Real Estate / Multifamily Finance – 
Quarterly Data Book” 
 




12. Jan de Beur, Marielle, Chris van Heerden, Lad Duncan, Landon C. Frerich (2008), “2009 CMBS 
Outlook: Finding the Bottom”, Wachovia Capital Markets, LLC. 
 
13. Harp Financial California Home Mortgage Company.  www.harpfinancial.com 
